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ABSTRACT
This paper develops a model for computing, the proba-
bility of kill for an air defense complex composed of
antiaircraft automatic weapons, radar controlled guns, and
missile batteries. Two dimensional terrain was used to
evaluate the model. The probabilities were determined at
major terrain points along the route of approach to the
vital area for altitudes of up to 3000 feet above terrain.
The curves of probability of kill versus altitude were
found to be dependent on terrain, air defense tactics, and
weapon system parameters. A survivability index is calcu-
lated by combining the probabilities of kill with a pilot
visual navigational probability. The resulting curves of
survivability index versus altitude were found to be non-
linear requiring a nonlinear programing technique to solve
for the altitude of optimal survivability index within
aircraft flight path constraints. The nonlinear solution
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CHAPTER I
During the first year of the United States' involvement
with the war in South East Asia, air power was employed
extensively against many targets in North Vietnam. The
commanders of attack aviation units were required to plan
and execute strikes against the same targets over and over
again. Initially air defense of these targets was sparse
to nonexistent. As time passed, air defense weapons were
supplied from communist bloc countries until the problem
presented to the attack force commander was what to do
about higher and higher attrition rates per raid. Specific-
ally, strike planners were seeking a solution to the problem
of finding the route of approach and altitude to fly into
the target which would minimize aircraft losses from air
defense means. One method of finding an answer to the
problem is to analyze the losses from previous raids. This
method is costly in lives and equipment and may not have
produced data describing results from many altitudes and
routes into the target. Using previous experience alone,
one may never discover the optimal route. A major factor
in the effectiveness of land air defenses is the terrain.
Very often terrain provides a natural route of approach
which in itself minimizes the capability of the air defense
efforts. Sometimes this fact is obvious and in other
situations it is not. It would be desirable in such a
situation to provide the attack air force commanders with a
method that determines the optimal approach altitude and
route that minimizes the air defense effort. The method
would generate an actual flight profile for the pilot. As
new data on the enemy's air defenses are ascertained, up-
dated flight profiles would be provided in the time period
between strikes. The method referred to here is a digital
computer model which evaluates all possible routes of
approach into a target. For each route, the model evaluates
the terrain, the air defenses situated therein, and the pilot
navigational problem for all feasible altitudes up to a
maximum value, and then determines the altitude along the
route which maximizes aircraft survivability. With a
functioning computer program which computes such a flight
profile, new information could be inserted into the program
and new results obtained in a matter of hours. Such a tool
would be of tremendous value to attack air force commanders.
The development of a mathematical model and computer
solution for generating a flight profile which maximizes
strike aircraft survivability was accomplished in a thesis by
Lieutenant Colonel tf. S. Miller, Jr., USMC, and Major E. E.
Brown, USMC, reference 1. In this work a model for calcu-
lating probabilities of detection of strike aircraft over
two dimensional terrain was combined with calculated proba-
bilities of detection of ground navigational targets to
generate a functional relationship of cost versus altitude
of the flight path above terrain. The term cost is defined
to be a probability index which is a linear combination of I
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probability of radar detection and the probability that the
ground navigational target was not detected at each alti-
tude above terrain from 100 feet to 3,000 feet. Using this
function as an objective function and calculating aircraft
flight path constraints for each terrain point, the problem
of determining that altitude which minimized the cost was
solved as a linear program. The probability of detection
mentioned above was calculated by computing at each terrain
point and altitude the ratio of terrain visable to the
total terrain within the coordinate system. As altitude
increased, less terrain was masked from the point in question.
Therefore, the probability of detection was found to increase
in approximately a linear fashion. This model assumed that
a radar within the air defense system could be placed at
any and all points along the terrain under the aircraft
flight path. In other words, radar locations were considered
to be uniformly distributed over the entire route of approach.
To be sure, this method of calculating the probability of
detection produces an indication of the effect of altitude
on terrain masking in evaluating air defense capability.
This paper extends the work of Miller and Brown. Since
the uniform distribution of radar sites is not realistic and
the method of calculating probability of radar detection is
at best only an indication of air defense capability, a
mathematical model and computer program will be developed to
calculate the probability of kill for three types of air
defense weapons sited in the terrain. Specifically, the
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problem to be solved will be to emplace an air defense com-
plex in a section of terrain in order to calculate at each
terrain point and altitude above terrain from 100 feet to
3,000 feet along the aircraft flight path the cumulative
probability of kill for an aircraft flying straight and
level up to each terrain point. The terrain points con-
sidered are those within the maximum effective range of the
longest ranged air defense unit to the defended area. The
problem reduces to finding the length of course line exposed
to radar detection and xiithin the effective range of the
weapon systems in order to determine the number of rounds
that may be fired from which the probability of kill is
determined. The model evaluates the terrain masking on
detection range and firing time. The problem is developed
for three dimensional terrain. The computer model was
programmed for three dimensional terrain. No digitalized
three dimensional terrain was found for use in this model.
The computer program was accordingly verified using only
two dimensional terrain which was available. That portion





A mathematical model will be designed to compute the
probability of kill for an approaching aircraft penetrating
an air defense complex composed of heavy antiaircraft gun
batteries, light antiaircraft automatic weapon batteries, and
surface to air missile batteries. The purpose of this model
is to determine a relationship of altitude versus probability
at each major terrain point through the air defense complex.
The model is designed to be general. No specific weapon
system parameters in existence are used in the calculations.
Values for the parameters are of the order of those found
in actual systems. The general nature of the model was
selected in order to permit its use with any system and to
prevent the necessity of classification under security
regulations.
PROBLEM FORMULATION
Since it is necessary to compute the probability of
kill at each terrain point and at altitudes of every 100
feet above terrain to 3>000 feet, a concept for what is
meant by a kill probability at a large number of specific
points in space along a route of approach must be defined.
The probability of kill by a weapon system is not defined at
a point. probability is calculated from the number of
rounds the weapon system is capable of firing while the
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target is within range. The kill probability at any partic-
ular terrain point and altitude, Pt^ » is defined to be the
cumulative probability of kill resulting from the fire of all
batteries of each type that bear on the target from each
battery's maximum range to the terrain point in question.
The amount of fire that each battery may produce is further
constrained by terrain masking at the lower altitudes as it
may occur. For example, at some terrain point k and alti-
tude i, a line is drawn back along the route of approach
to the beginning of the coordinate system or to the point
of contact with a terrain formation, whichever is the shorter.
Figure 1 is a diagram illustrating a two dimensional view
of the terrain showing terrain points with altitude points
above the terrain and the course lines associated with the
(k,l)th point, representing the kth terrain point and ith
altitude. In the figure, point F represents the 4th terrain
point and the 1st altitude. Drawn from this point is a
line back along the course line of aircraft flight as pre-
viously described. In this case, the line intersects a
terrain formation at point G. The model assumes that when
terrain interrupts a continuous flight, the aircraft will fly
over the obstruction and continue on at the prescribed
altitude. The line from G to F will represent a portion of
the aircraft flight path. If a battery were located at
point L, a probability of kill will be calculated from the
number of rounds fired if sufficient time permits the firing

















the course from G to F° Such a battery would be located at
point L. The value of probability calculated here will be a
number greater than or equal to zero for altitude 1 at
terrain point 4. These numbers become part of some func-
tional relationship existing at terrain point 4. Another
example of discontinuous flight is at points H and I, The
uninterrupted case is seen at point A, C, D, and E. Here
no terrain obstruction enters into the situation and the
factors effecting the probability calculated depend on the
length of course lying in the detection radar beam pattern
and the weapon system effectiveness envelope. As an example,
consider a battery located at terrain point 5« If tiie
model were evaluating the probability of kill contributed
by this battery up to point (4,2), the number of rounds that
could be fired as the aircraft traveled from point B to point
(4,2) would be the determining factor. B is the point where
the flight path passes into the radar beam pattern while
point A is where the flight path enters the weapon system
effectiveness envelope . The portion of the flight in
both radar and battery effectiveness envelope only, enables
firing to occur. Since the altitude of approach is so low,
the aircraft cannot first be detected until point B. At
point (4, 3) the battery at terrain point 5 detects the
targets at point M in advance of its entry into the battery
effectiveness envelope. A normal fire mission can be con-
ducted in this case with adequate warning time.
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Coordinate System
In order for calculations to be carried out by the com-
puter a coordinate system must be placed on the terrain
section of interest. No existing map coordinate system
will suffice. The coordinate square must be small enough to
provide an acceptable approximation of the terrain contours.
Figure 2 is a diagram from a top view of the terrain and
battery situation. This view shows two dimensions, distance
along the course line, and offset distance from the course
line for terrain and battery positions.
The grid system shown in Figure 2 shall be the size
necessary to cover the section of terrain holding the air
defense complex of interest. A route of approach to be
analyzed is selected and the grid system is placed over this
route on an appropriate map with the x axis parallel to tne
course direction and centered over the line. At the inter-
section of each grid line, the altitude taken from the
terrain contour lines is recorded along with the X and Y
coordinates. The altitude above sea level becomes the H
coordinate. All distances in this model are in feet. The
X, Y, and H values are then punched on IBM cards for placing
on computer tape as data input. The job of preparing map
data for transfer to computer tape is tedious and time
consuming. For an individual to attempt the task would be
impractical. A team of trained operations plotters equiped
with the proper equipment would be capable of accomplishing
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the computer model was solved using two dimensional data.
The model was verified with this data except for the line
of sight calculations for batteries not on the target flight
line. The two dimensional terrain was taken from reference
1. Each major terrain point was selected as either a peak
or a valley. A sample of the terrain is shown in Figure 3
and k. Figure 3 is the detailed profile of the terrain.
Figure k is the simplified version obtained by drawing
straight lines between major terrain points. For a sample
of the terrain actually used in the model see Figure 5
through 7. The coordinates of the major peaks and valleys
in the x direction and altitude in the H direction are re-
corded in Appendix 2. The offset distance Y is zero for all
computations but is carried along in the model for possible
future use. Coordinates of the battery positions used are
found in Appendix 2. Referring again to Figure 1, it should
be noted that the A coordinate has its lowest value at the
entrance of the air defense complex and increases to the
maximuui { coordinate value at the defended area.
Air Defense Complex
The three general types of weapons systems are the
antiaircraft automatic weapon battery, the medium to heavy
antiaircraft artillery battery, and the surface to air
missile battery. These three are used since they cover the
spectrum of ground to air weapon systems to be encountered
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The automatic weapons battery is defined to be a 10 gun
unit of rapid firing weapons, five mounts, two guns to a
mount. The fire control is by optics with target course
and speed estimated by the crew. A computer is used to
generate predicted azimuth and elevation for positioning
the gun. Early warning is by radar with target acquisition
by optical means. The medium to heavy antiaircraft artillery
battery is composed of 4 guns with early warning radar, gun
laying radar, and computer generated gun positioning signals
via appropriate servo systems.
The surface to air missile system is a low to medium
altitude system. It is capable of detecting targets within
its early radar beam pattern which is approximately from 1°
elevation to 50° for volume coverage. The radar is assumed
to possess effective moving target indication at the low
altitudes. The tracking radars are also assumed to have
low altitude capability. Since only one aircraft is attack-
ing the complex in this model it is not necessary to specify
the type of guidance xvith respect to the number of targets
the system may attack at one time.
The batteries are placed in the 2 dimensional terrain
on the course line at various terrain points. The effect of
terrain and increasing altitude, and the cumulative effect
of more than one battery firing on a target is obtained from
the various battery locations. No battery is permitted to
fire at outbound targets. Each battery may fire from its
maximum range or detection range up to its minimum range or
2k
to its maximum turning rate in azimuth to the terrain point
in question, whichever occurs first. No battery is permitted
to fire on targets at a lower altitude than its own since
this is not feasibly done.
Weapon Target Kinematics
In order to determine the length of target course line
exposed to the fire of any battery, it is necessary to define
the parameters of weapon target dynamics. Figure 8 is a
three dimensional diagram of the problem to be solved. The
line C D is the path the aircraft flies as it passes into
the range of battery J as evaluated at the (k, i)tn point.
Line A B is the projection of target course on a horizontal
plane at the same altitude as the jth battery. The .AH, the
difference in altitude between the jth battery and the ith
altitude of approach, is given by
AH=|AHk ;-BH il . . . } 30
• ' (i)
The difference in position of the kth terrain point and the


















Likewise for the offset distance of the Jth battery
K « i - . . N







AHKi = H +<oo'.
30
K - i> • • •) N
i « » •-*,
(4)
N = number of terrain points where a probability
versus altitude function will be calculated
30 = number of altitude points above terrain for
which probability calculations will be accomplished
N, = number of weapon batteries employed in
the terrain.
The other parameters are defined as follows:
R = slant range from the battery to the
(k,i)th point
&*•« = horizontal component of R_
R = maximum effective range of the weapon system
R ss horizontal component of R
R = horizontal component of the range at which
the lower portion of the radar beam, at the estimated half
power point of the radar beam pattern, intersects the target
course line
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XQ = the distance J L along the course line from
the maximum open fire range of the system to the (k, i)th
point being evaluated. This parameter is the key distance
which will determine the probability to be developed later.
XDR = the warning distance, H J from maximum
detection range to maximum open fire range
= the estimated elevation of the half power
point of the lower edge of the radar beam pattern.
Calculating Equations of the Model
In this section all calculating equations will be
explained or derived as appropriate.
prevent Outbound Firing . In a high threat operating con-
dition when enemy attack is probable cr imminent, air
defense commanders are more concerned with the inbound raid
than outbound raids. If a target passes through the fires
of a particular battery, the probability of an outbound
kill is less in most cases than an inbound raid. The danger
of firing at outbound raids results from not being ready to
engage the next inbound raid c Therefore the policy of not
firing past the position of any battery is designed into the
model. To insure no outbound firing £X is calculated in





O • AX >0
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Since any terrain point with a greater X coordinate value
lies in an outbound direction from the jth battery, AX >
in this case. Firing is permitted up to the minimum range of
the Jth battery, therefore setting AX = permits later
calculations for Xq up to Bx ^ rather than to Xk *. Any
terrain whose X coordinate is less than B
x
, will produce a
AX > and AX will be set equal to /X, . - B„,/.
jS.2. X J
Determine Slant Range . The slant range to the (k, i)th




In Figure 8, it can be seen that R is the vector sum of
AX, AY, and AH. Therefore equation (6) will hold. For any
battery j whose maximum range Rm < R will not contribute any
probability of kill. Therefore no calculations for the jth
battery will be carried out in this case.
Determine if Target Elevation is Negative . Since firing at
elevations below 0° is not feasible for many reasons, this <J
model excludes such cases. After solving for AH in (1),
if AH<0, excludes the jth battery from a probability
calculation. Figure 9 illustrates this case.
Minimum Firing Range . In certain cases which arise in this
model the (k, i)th point lies over the jth battery or is
inside the dead zone of battery effectiveness. The model
must determine when this situation occurs and permit firing
up to the minimum firing range for the ith altitude of





situation. Rp is the minimum firing range for the system.
Angle B is the maximum elevation angle which is the minimum
of the maximum radar antenna elevation angle and maximum
elevation angle of the gun or launcher.
RXF - RF cos © (7)
R as previously defined is given by
R<s = W - AH' (8)
from Figure 8. If R^
s
< Rv-p> then firing must terminate at




+ AH" i R*s * R XF
(9)
Maximum Azimuth Tracking Rates . V/hen the jth battery is at
some distance AY from the course line, it is possible for
the maximum tracking rate of the system to be exceeded before
the (K, i)th point is reached. If this should occur the
distance XD would be decreased. The amount of this decrease
is calculated by finding that point on the course line where
maximum tracking occurs and determining if it lies between
(k, l)th point and the crossover point which is where aX =
or before the (k, i)th point is reached. If the point of
maximum tracking rate occurs before (k, i)th point on the







point of maximum tracking rate and (k, i)th point. Figure
11 is a diagram of the azimuth tracking rate problem on the
horizontal plane. Point K is the point where firing must
terminate projected on the horizontal plane at the same
altitude as battery J. The tracking rate must first be
determined at this point. Let AZ be the azimuth tracking
rate . Then
where V = tangential velocity of the aircraft at point K
XT
and R = horizontal component of the range to point K and
aS
was calculated in equation (8). From Figure 11 it is clear
that VXT is given by
Substituting this result into the equation above yields
A2 = VtAV
Now substituting equation (8) into (10) results in
If AZM - maximum tracking rate for the system engaged, and
AZ < AZ.., no constraint due to tracking rate is active. If
however AZ > AZ , then the constraint is active and firing
must terminate at the point where the maximum rate occurred.
To find this point solve equation (10) for Rxs when AZ is
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replaced by AZ™ resulting in
**s
V A'ZM . (12)
Using the value of R determined in (12) a new value for




Equation (13) has changed the (k, i)th point to reflect the
constraint due to the maximum azimuth tracking rate
Maximum Elevation Tracking Rate . The same problem occurs
in elevation as in azimuth for the possibility of exceeding
tracking rates at low altitudes. In some cases the elevation
tracking rate is exceeded at a range further from the (K, i )th
point than minimum range. It is necessary to compute the
elevation tracking rate and determine if it is an active
constraint. Figure 12 is a three dimensional diagram
illustrating the vector component of target velocity tangen-
tial to the battery target line of sight. The tangential
velocity in elevation is given by
V-
v^Vah** av
XTE R g (1*0
where the
\/AH v 4- AY
^













If EL>EL.., where EL is the maximum tracking rate in eleva-
tion of the particular system, then it is necessary to find
the range at which the maximum rate occurs. Solving (16)
for RSE gives
se





= MAX (RSA , RSE )
and the new &X is determined by
AX - y <V-AH*-AV* (17)
At this point the conditions for terminating the firing
at or before the (j, i)th point have been found. It is now
necessary to find the point of open firing and then evaluate
the effect of terrain on the length of course line between
the open fire point, cease fire point, and the battery lo-
cation.
35
Open Fire Point . Referring to Figure 8, it is seen that the
open fire jjoint is at H„ The distance XQ is from the cease
fire point which may or may not be the (k, i)th point to H.
Depending upon the value of H, the distance Xp.D may haveDa.
positive, negative, or zero values point F must be found
as it is the point where the detection radar first intersects
the target course line. Figure 13 diagrams the situation.
Lines 1 and 2 represent different altitudes of approach and
the different points of detection in range. The horizontal
range to the point of detection is found as follows:
R* - 4un e
^ (i8)
This relationship will be a good approximation since the
ranges where the beam pattern begins to curve are far beyond
the maximum effective range of any weapon system. The hori-




The distance X~ / X-m-, on the target course line must be
above all terrain points and must be visible over its entire
length from the battery position in question. The effect
of terrain on low altitude approaches on the distance
X / X may be such that its value is decreased to less
than zero when no firing is possible. A method of evaluat-






Terrain Evaluation , The method to be used for determining
if line of sight exists from the point of radar detection to
the battery position is to compute the slope of the line
from this point to the battery as well as the slope from
each intervening terrain point to the point of radar detec-
tion. If the slopes of the terrain points are greater than
the slope to the point of radar detection then line of sight
exists. If one or more terrain points extend above the line
joining the battery and the point of radar detection, the
line of sight does not exist for the length of the course
line beyond the masking terrain points. A new point of
radar detection is then found 9 A new slope line is com-
puted from the masking terrain point at the altitude of
approach and the battery. As before, all remaining inter-
vening terrain point slopes are examined to determine if any
more are masking the target course line. If another point
has a slope less than the battery radar detection point
line, then this higher terrain point becomes the new radar
detection point. Depending on the terrain, the distance
X-. / X may be uneffected or reduced to zero. If XNK is
the coordinate of the radar detection point then the slope
to the battery position is given by
A u ; - 6 U ;
S,
Hi ~ w Hj
LPB 8y -X«K (20)
The slope of each terrain point to radar detection point is
38
5LPm Xm | - X
(21)
where
A^ = altitude of (k, i)th terrain point
n, 1
H _ = altitude of the (m.l)th terrain point
m,l *
m = mth terrain point betiveen the battery and
the radar detection point
1 = coordinate index of the offset distance
from the course line
X , s= X coordinate of the intervening terrain
m,l
points
As long- as the engaged battery is located under the
target course line, the determination of major terrain
points that may mask the line of sight is a relatively easy
matter and the slope calculations are simple. Figure 14
is a diagram of the calculation of slope, points 1, 2, 3>
and 4 represent terrain points which may be typically found
between battery J and the radar detection point L. As shown
in the diagram, terrain 3 and fy have greater slopes than
the line B
. ,L* They do not mask the line of sight. Terrain
Xj
point 2 has a smaller slope than E ,L and does mask the line
of sight. Therefore, point 5 is the new radar detection
point at which a new comparison slope must be calculated.




^^ - B Hj
This equation is derived from similar triangles in Figure 14.
The value of the X coordinate of point 3 is given by
*NV^ " »*j _Z-
# (23)
When the engaged battery is located at some offset
distance, Y from the target course line, a procedure must be
found to determine if line of sight exists between the
battery j and all the terrain that lies between the lines
joining the cease fire point, and radar detection point on
the target course line. Figure 15 illustrates this problem.
Notice the coordinate grid. At each intersection of a grid
coordinate, an IBM card recorded the X, Y grid index along
with the altitude at the intersection. Notice also that
the X coordinate is parallel to the target course line.
As previously indicated, the X coordinate increases in the
direction of target flight. point J is the battery position.
In order to determine if line of sight exists from J to X,TV
IN xl
the slope of all terrain located on the line J, X will be
computed and compared to the slope of the line J, X. T ,.. In
order to find the vertical and horizontal differential for
all points on line J, X. TT ., a series of triangles will be
solved for the hypotenuse such as a, b, c in Figure 15. The
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calculation. The distance be is, if added to X , the X
NK
coordinate of the closest point to p. Using the altitude
of point p which has been recorded as previously described
in digitalizing the terrain, the slope of the line X ,C is
NK
calculated. The distance be is given by
be = ab tan a (2*0
where
ab = distance between Y grid lines










For each successive triangle, ab is replaced by Nab where
and
N = (B - Y.
, ) / Ik - 1
yj k >!
B = Y coordinate of battery j











Solving (27) and (28) for each value of N, enables the slope
to be found at each Y, interval and establishes line of sight
along the particular line being examined. If any terrain
slope is less than the comparison slope, then line of sight
does not exist on that particular line from J to X . In
this case X„, is increased by one X coordinate grid distance,
NX
X, and the slope calculation process is again repeated.
The value of X which remains after each slope line is
compared with terrain determines the actual radar detection
point. In the three dimensional case it is possible to
track a target up to a terrain formation masking a portion
of the target course line between the cease fire and radar
detection point, and either continue tracking through the
mask in memory track, enabling relock, or to lose lock and
require reacquisitlon on the other side of the mask. In
the relock situation, the previous radar detection point
X.T_. stands . If reacquisitlon is necessary, then a new
value of xwv is computed from the point where the terrain





^T ( 2 9)
T = time for aircraft to pass terrain mask
x
X = distance on course line masking line of sight
P
to the battery
"7 = aircraft speed
T
If T_ < T , where T is the memory tracking period, then Xx — ni m NK










X, = distance between X grid lines
N = number of grid lines spanned by the terrain
Determination of Length of Course Line for Firing . With
the computation of X , and the cease fire point after con-
nk
sidering maximum effective range of the system, maximum
radar detection range, and effects of possible terrain
masking, the distance Bv , - X . is available for firingX j nk
after the system delays have been accounted for. The system
delays assumed in this model are as follows:
^5
(1) Reaction time, t , which is the average of time
r
for the radar operator to recognize target pips on the plan
position indicator of the early warning radar set in the
battery operations center, identification of the target and
decision to engage the target.
(2) Transfer action time, t , which is the time for the
SI
fire control operators to receive an assignment, lock the
tracking radar on the target account for computer settling
time, and gun crew reaction time to fire the first round.
(3) Time of flight of the first round of the system to
reach the target
Average values for (1) and (2) are assumed but time of flight
is calculated from system parameters „ An equation for




R _ - range to open fire
of
V = projectile muzzle velocity
k = projectile drag
P
If the k is known, (31) is a useful formula. If a system
P
graph of time of flight versus slant range is available, a
regression equation is also useful . This model uses a re-
gression equation approximateing a typical system curve of
slant range versus time of flight. The concept is to place
the first round on the target at the maximum effective range
46
of the system. If sufficient time exists for the target
to travel from the point of detection to open fire range,
then the system is assumed to expend the time
t = t / t / t
T r r a r f
prior to the targets arrival at the open fire range. If
the detection range is less than maximum effective range,
then the time t™ will reduce the time for firing. If on
the other hand only a part of the time t„, is expended prior
to open fire range, then some proportion of the tT will






D. - the distance the target travels during the
t
system delay time





may have a new value. Therefore, the range to the maximum
radar detection point is given by
Rh = V(BXj-XN^AY* (33)
This relationship is illustrated in Figure 15. Since detec-
tion range may have decreased to be less than R , the open
Xm
fire range, as a result of terrain restrictions, R^. is now
given by
'+7
Actually, R is the horizontal range component,, The slant
range to open fire becomes
R0P -- Vr^ + ax^ + aV
t (35)
The distance along the course line from the radar detection







Now the distance on the course line involved in reaction time
t may be all within X if XQR > t™, or part of tT may be in
X if X < t To If XDR # then t T will reduce XD by the
amount t TVT o XD will also be reduced by the time of flight
for the last round fired since any round fired after the
point (k 9 i) is reached does not contribute to the proba-
bility of kill up to point (k,i) e Therefore, Xq is given by
where




= (tp + t ) vT
^8
Having derived the equation for X , the length of course
line available for firing, it only remains to determine the
number of rounds that will be fired in the time the target
passes over XD „ The time for target passage is
T = *2L (38)








If X^ < X_, then the entire delay time including the time
Uci T
of flight of the first round occurs during the early warning
time period and (39) becomes
Probability Model , In Chapter I, it was stated that the
model was being developed for three different air defense
systems. In the development of the model, the general
scheme was to permit all calculations to apply to each type
of weapon system except for the parameters used in the com-
puter model
.
Except for the regression equations used for
determining time of flight, this generality has been success-
ful. However, the models must be separated for probability
calculations into a separate one applying to each weapon
ij-9
system* In the case of the two types of gun systems, a
common model Is still possible with one or two exceptions.
The radar controlled antiaircraft gun system will be delt
with first . The range at which each round is fired is
computed as follows:
This model assumes that the area a gun fires into is defined
by a circular normal probability curve. The square of the
radius of the circle described thusly has been determined
empirically in references 2, 3, and k is given by
<r^(,wv/ty » t(2ttPy+ <*& (42)
where
cr^ - angular error of the gun in milliradians.
<f£ is the result of all the errors introduced by the fire
control, data transmission, orientation, and alignment of
the battery. Equation (^2) is based upon the following
theoretical equation:




S = quasi static errors consisting of
(1) Boresighting and alignment
(2) Range errors (radar developed), radar
timing errors due to mechanical alignment
(3) Servo lag errors
(k) Computer error
(a) static errors
(b) ballistic match errors
(c) prediction errors
(5) Battery emplacement errors
S = Tracking perturbation
S = Flight roughness
The constants and results of using equation (^-2) have been
verified in actual test firings according to reference 2.
Target Area ,, The average cross sectional area of the tar-
get's vulnerable sections is denoted by A in square feet.
The vulnerable cross sectional area changes with different
positional attitudes. An average value is assumed in the
following calculations. In addition a method for calculating
the area as a function of target attitude was also imple-
mented. This area is computed from
Ai-ft A < + i A7+ |. A H (W)
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where
A = percentage of area presented for the ith
i
round fired
R s the range of the ith round
i
X = the X component of the range to the target
i
at the ith round fired
Ajj. = cross sectional area of the standard target
defined to be ^00 ft2 in the X coordinate.
A = same as above for the Y coordinate set at
800 ft2




Y = the Y component of the range to the target
at the ith round fired
H = the H coordinate of the range to the target
at the ith round fired
The standard target may then be compared with any other
target for converting probabilities.
The probability that one round from the gun hits the target
is the ratio of the vulnerable cross sectional area of the
aircraft to the area the weapon fires into as follows:
P - A
The probability required is the probability that one round
kills the target. If the probability of kill given a hit
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is P[K/Hj then the probability of kill, assuming indepen-
dence, is P[K/Hj p[h]« Using this fact equation (44)
becomes
1 (^5)
If N is the number of rounds fired, assuming independence




N - number of guns in the battery. With all
g
guns firing the probability that the aircraft is killed,
assuming independence of guns in the battery, is given by
p c >-(i-(V)^
The second type of weapon system is the automatic weapon
battery. This battery does not possess gun laying radar.
It depends on the optical means for acquiring the target.
Early warning radar is assumed available. All equations in
the previous model are applicable except equation (42).
The total error for a gun with optical sights is assumed
circular normal with the square of the radius of the circle
of error given by
trr\ c.\\ir ±ff (Jt8)
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This equation like (42) has been empirically determined and
verified according to reference 2
In the surface to air missile battery, the third type
of weapon system, a simplified model is assumed. Specific
models are not feasible in order for the computer model to
be applicable to any type of missile system. Therefore, the
single shot kill probability is p. Then the battery kill
probability is given by
»
N was calculated previously. However, in the missile
r
battery the number of rounds fired at any target is con-
strained by the basic load of missiles. Further the high
single shot kill probability of a missile round precludes
the firing of more than 2 or 3 missiles per target in most




Any particular battery firing policy may change the value
of N as the tactical situation may dictate,
r
For each terrain point k and altitude i, P is cal-
kj
culated for all batteries. Then the overall kill probability







j = '>*,•», N|
The assumption of independence is quite valid for equation
(51) since all batteries act independently in actual firing.
Equation (46) also requires the assumption of independence
between each round fired. If the weapon is a radar con-
trolled gun using equation (42) to model the area within
which all rounds are fired, the probability of a hit for
each round p. , must be independent for each value of i for
the assumption to hold in (46). When examining the factors
which determined (46), it is seen that certain of the errors
are the same from round to round or are corrolated errors.
These errors tend to break down the assumption of inde-
pendence. Most of the errors are random in nature from
round to round and are the factors supporting the assumption
of independence. It is not known how serious the correlated
errors effect the results of equation (46). If independence













The difference between the probabilities in (46) and the
conditional probabilities in (52) constitutes the error if
if is significant. All models found in the literature use
the independence assumption,, Investigation of the proba-
bilities in (52) to determine how bad the assumption of




In order to perform the calculations necessary to
produce a relationship of altitude versus probability at
each terrain point within the range of any battery in the
defensive complex, a computer program capable of performing
the calculations is essential. If the resulting computer
program is to have any lasting value, the program itself
must be documented in order to make clear how the program
was designed and how the problem was solved by the computer.
An explanation of the Fortran variables is found in Appendix
III with the Fortran program located in Appendix IV.
The program was originally designed to produce as an
output an array of probabilities and corresponding altitudes
for each terrain point examined. It was expected that the
results would be punched on an output deck for use as an
input to the computer program in reference 1, The output
deck from this program would then replace the probability
calculations in the other program. This replacement has
not been possible for reasons to be explained in a later
chapter.
Computer Inputs
The inputs to the computer are of two types . The
terrain digitalization and the weapon system parameters.
The three arrays X s Y , and H, are the coordinatesk,l' k,i J k,i
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of the major terrain points being examined. In the two
dimensional problem this is all the data needed. If the
three dimensional data is available, three more arrays
would be needed to record the terrain contours through out
the area of interest. The arrays HH for altitude, XX^ ,
I,K I,K'
X coordinate, and YY the Y coordinate of each recorded
I,K
terrain point would also have to be inputs to the program.
As previously explained, the model was developed for
any weapon system. If the model is to represent any specific
weapon system the input parameters necessary to define the
system must be clearly understood. An explanation of the
input parameters is contained later in this chapter. The
parameters are defined in the Fortran code notation to
facilitate their incorporation into the computer program.
Description of Computer Solution .
Figures 16, l6a, and 17 are a block diagram of the com-
puter program in general terms. The following description
will relate to the block diagram.
Block #1 . All data is read into the computer with units in
feet and seconds ,, angles are in degrees.
Block #2 . Most parameters of angular measure are given in
degrees o The program converts all degrees to radiams.
Block #3 * The program is solved once for each N batteries
at each of JO altitudes and for each of N terrain points.
This constitutes 30 N, N iterations which in the sample used
in the actual program is 30 x 11 x 53 = 18,^90 iterations.
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Block #k . In order to permit the program to use the same
code for solving the problem for all three types of weapon
systems, the system parameters are converted to a common set
which represents the values corresponding to the particular
system being examined at any one time.
Blocks #5» 6, 7, 8, 9 . Antiaircraft fire has been con-
strained by
(1) Firing only at Inbound targets
(2) Not firing at targets out of range
(3) Not firing at targets lower in elevation
than the battery
(k) Not firing at less than minimun range
(5) Not exceeding maximum azimuth and elevation
tracking rates.
A section of computer code as shown is Figure 16 provides the
calculations to determine, at each iteration, the occurance
of any one of the five constraints listed above. The overall
effect of each of the constraints will now be explained.
(1) The program is designed to permit firing up to
minimum range or to the point of maximum azimuth and ele-
vation tracking rates. If a terrain point is well behind
the battery or in the opposite end of the course from the
direction of target attack, the minimum point is thusly
established. On the other hand, if the terrain point in
question is in the direction of attack, then the terrain
point itself is the cease fire point unless the above
constraints act to increase the cease fire range.
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(2) Firing at targets that will always be out of range
is prevented by assigning zero to the probability of kill if
the range to the terrain point and altitude is beyond system
range,
(3) If a target is lower in elevation than the battery,
zero is assigned the probability of kill for that battery
at that altitude,,
(*0 Jhen either minimum range, maximum azimuth and
elevation tracking rates are exceeded, whichever occurs
first, the cease fire range is increased to that point.
Block #10 . The subroutine LOS is called at this point which
calculates the distance of course line available for firing.
The function of LOS will be explained later.
Block #11 . The length of target course line available for
firing resulting from terrain considerations may produce a
new value for open fire range. Based upon the value of XQ ,
the open fire range is calculated.
Block #12 . Depending on what type of battery is engaged,
the program will go through one of the three paths in this
block. The probability of kill depending on the number of
rounds fired is calculated for one of the three systems.
Block #l^ a The overall kill probability is computed here
for one iteration which includes all weapons at one terrain
point and one altitude a
Block #15 ° After all iterations are completed the program
is capable of plotting the curves of altitude versus
probability. Any other output is available when desired.
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Subroutine LOS
Block #1 . Receiving all necessary data from the main pro-
gram, all calculations planned are possible. Radar warning
time is determined prior to terrain evaluation. The value
for the point of first detection is the result of this
block.
Block #2 . Here the program determines which terrain points
lie between the battery and the point of first detection.
If any terrain interrupts the line of sight, a new value
for radar detection point is calculated. The computations
are for two dimensional terrain which mean terrain for
batteries on the target line of sight.
Block #3> jK If three dimensional terrain is used, sub-
routine SEE is called where the point of radar detection, as
a result of terrain, is found.
Block #5 « Open fire range without regard to delay is
calculated for use in determining time of flight.
Block #6 . Again the program branches into three paths, one
for each weapon system. This is necessary since each system
has a different function of slant range versus time of flight.
Block #7 » The delay time which is the sum of crew reaction
time, system delay time, and time of flight of the first
round fired is calculated in this section. This value is
not used in the case where early warning time is less than
total delay time.
Block #8 . After all the above calculations are completed,
it is possible to find the actual point of open fire. This
6k
point is the range at which the first round is placed during
delay time to maximize the number of rounds fired. Three
possible situations arise in calculations for the open fire
point as shown in Chapter II , equation (35)° These are
(1) Adequate warning time exists for all delay time
to occur during the early warning periodo
(2) Only part of the delay time occurs during the early
warning period and the open fire point is reduced e
(3) All of the delay time must fall during possible
firing time due to the radar detection point being less
than maximum effective range The subroutine sends XD
back to the main program «,
A Description of Input Parameters
At some later time, it may be desirable to compute
the results from the model for an actual air defense system.
In order to do this, an explanation of the input parameters
is essential, A description of how to insert new inputs
is provided below s Statement number k in Appendix III is
the data statement. Contained in this statement are all
the system parameters The program is convertable to any
specific weapon systems by changing the values in the pro-
gram data statement to conform to those of the new systems.
Included with the description of each parameter is the value
















Number of altitude points
above terrain examined.
NAP - 30
Number of terrain points
examined. NAP = 84
Number of batteries placed
in the terrain. NFU = 11
Maximum elevation tracking
rate for the radar controlled
gun system. ELRMG = 10°/sec
Maximum elevation tracking
rate for the automatic weapon
battery. ELRMA = 20°/sec
Maximum elevation tracking
rate for the missile battery.
ELRMM = 15°/sec
Maximum Azimuth tracking
rate for radar controlled gun.
AZRMG = 12°/sec
Maximum azimuth tracking
rate for automatic weapon
battery. AZRMA = 20°/sec
Maximum azimuth tracking
rate for the missile system.
AZRMM = 15°/sec
Maximum effective range for
radar controlled gun battery.
RMG = 45*000 feet
Maximum effective range AAV/
battery. RMA = 6,000 feet
Maximum effective range
missile system.
RMM = 105,600 feet
Elevation angle for lower
portion of detection radar
beam pattern at half power


















Elevation angle for detection
radar , AAVJ battery, THET 2 = .5
Elevation angle for detection
radar*, missile battery.
THET 3 = l-°0
The constant term in the linear





The constant in the expo-
nential equation for time of
flight for AAW Battery.
CONT = .0002
Distance between Y grid lines,
three dimensional terrain.
YK = 500 feet.
Target speed. VT = 350 ft/sec
Crew reaction time. This time
is measured from time of first
decision of detection of tar-
get to track radar lock on.
This is an average figure.
TRG = gun system, TRA = AAW
system, and TRM = missile
system. TRG = 30 sec.
TRA = 10 sec. TRM = 30 sec.
System delay time measured
from radar lock on to first
round fired for gun battery,
AAtf battery s and missile
battery. ATG = 20 sec.
ATA = 5 sec. ATM = 10 sec.
Total, number of gun batteries.
LT 1 =J*
Total number of AAV/ batteries
plus gun batteries, LT 2 = 10
Total number of gun batteries
plus AA'i batteries plus
missile batteries, LT 3 = -11
6?
A Cross sectional area of target.
The average value as target
aspect changes. A = 350 feet
SIG Angular error of radar- con-
trolled
-AA gun when firing at
a fixed point. SIG = 1.5 raille
radians
GUNS The number of guns per gun
battery. GUNS = k
TCRA Cyclic rate of fire, AAW
battery. TCRA = 6 rounds/sec
PKSM Single shot kill probability
for missile system. PKSM = .^8
NR The firing policy of the
missile battery, NR rounds
per target. NR = 2
TIM Time for one round fired from
the gun battery. TIM = 20 sec
AGUN Number of guns per kkA battery.
AGUN = b
TX Memory track period for all
systems. TX = 15 sec
LY Index number for the Y coor-
dinate of the target course'
line terrain points. LY = 1
RMPG Minimum firing range,' gun
battery. RMFG = 500 feet
RMFA Minimum firing range for AA^
battery. RMFA = 500 feet
RMFM Minimum firing range for
missile system. RMFM = 9500
feet
FE Maximum elevation angle for
all track radars. FE = 87
YM Slope of the linear regression
equation for time of flight of
the gun battery. YM = .0007
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ZM Constant in linear regression
equation for time of flight
of missile system. AM = 2,000
SM Slope of linear regression
equation. "SM = 1200
PG Probability of a kill given a
hit for the gun battery. This
Is the lithality factor.
PG = ,8
PA Probability of kill given a
hit for the AAtf battery.
PA = .3
Certain other parameters may be found in the data list. If
they are not included in the list above, they are not in use
in the final form of the program and should be disregarded.
Terrain Data Input s Statement number 7 in the main program
is the read statement which picks up the data punched on
84 data cards. Here the variable NTT is set equal to 84.
If in a subsequent use of the program more terrain points
were required, changing the value of NTT and providing the
same number of data cards provides the change. Statement
number 8 reads in the coordinates of the Batteries. It is
essential that the first system type be radar controlled
gun batteries up to LT 1. Then the next type must be AA^
batteries up to LT 2 which was defined to be LT 1 / the
number of AAW batteries. The last system in order is the
missile battery. Generally only one missile battery will
be in range of a single azimuth of approach unless the
azimuth is in the overlapping zones of fire of two adjacent
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batteries. Setting the values of LT 1, Lt 2, and LT 3 along
with the proper ordering of the data cards of each type of
weapon system constitutes the conversion to a new defensive
complex.
Three Dimensional Data Input . If three dimensional data is
to be used, three new arrays must be introduced for the X,
Y„ and H coordinates of each recorded terrain point. slhen
this is done, statement 6 in subroutine SEE must be re-
placed by a statement using the new altitude array for
H(J,ly) presently in the program.
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CHAPTER IV
PROGRAM VERIFICATION, RESULTS, AND ANALYSIS
The underlying factor in the model design from concep-
tion has been that the air defense capability is maximized.
This means that the attacking aircraft situation is the
worst possible condition for survival. This fact is appar-
ent when considering the general model structure presented
in Chapter II. It should be recalled that the aircraft
was required to penetrate the defense from out of range to
the defended area flying a straight and level course, with
a raid size of one aircraft, and no electronic counter
measures. In addition, the defense was assumed to be alerted,
manned, and concentrating on the single intruder. The air-
craft survivability index calculated in the model when
submitted to a programing algorithm for minimization within
the aircraft flight constraints finds the flight path which
minimized the probability of kill under the worst possible
attacking conditions. In actual application, anything the
aircraft may do relieving the sever restrictions, wholly or
in part, increases the survivability index. The act of
following the programed output recommended flight path,
penetrating the defense with more than one aircraft in the
raid, and using electronic counter measures will increase
survivability. These facts must be considered when evalu-
ating the model* s results.
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tfith the development of the model and the program for
the computer, a verification of its main computing aspects
is in order. Following this, the computer results will be
presented and analyzed.
Verification of Computer Results
The two main problems solved by the computer within
the mathmetical model are the calculations for determining
line of sight, in two dimensional terrain only, and the
calculations for the probability of kill given a positive
course line. All other computations within the program
support these main requirements.
Terrain Evaluation
. In order to verify the computer solu-
tion of the line of sight, a sample of computer print out
contained in Figures 18 and 19 Is presented,, Figure 18 is
a case where the coordinates of the point of maximum radar
detection, X , = 26140. The range of first detection is
nk
163,060 feet since the coordinates of Battery 6 are given
as B £ = 189,200 on the X axis and 6?00 feet altitude*. The
comparison slope SLpB = .OO873, kk = k6, and II = 5« II is
the terrain point number just greater than X k . KK is the
terrain point number just less £han B ^. Thus, the program
has determined the number of intervening terrain points to
examine for slope comparison. As explained in Chapter II,
if any slope S is less than S T „,_ then line of sight asLP LPB
corrected by the distance Z exists. Observing Figure 18
again, it is seen that S_ (5) through S (29) are greaterLP LP
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SLP( 45) = C. 12469532 X(N,LY) =
SLPi 46)=C.C759_C67 X(f,l.Y) =
XNK= 183740. BX(J)= ie920C.







M= 46 Z= 5459.86
6TERRAIN PQIKJ 6_2_AIXI JJJDEL J7
Figure 18
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Computer line of Si^hb Compv t 4 5
XNK=- 145CW. BX(J1= 1967U3. KXM= ti
SLPB= C- C 1 *5 55 KK= 471 1= 33
SLP( 33)=C. 56328574 X(N,LY>= 147709.
1 1 P( ?4)=C_3 16.24, £ S.7_XLV_,JLYJ = L4.9.L5.L.
25)=C.26l6C727 X(^ t LY)= 150589.
26)=0.C79C461C X(^,IY)= 158059.
37)^C.02CC2221 X ( f^ , L Y I = 159925.
_2 8J_=CC4.El132 8A^X(A,LY) = 1.6160JSL*.
SLP( 29)=C. 02674535 X(N,LY)= 163974.
SLP( 40)=C.C2631744 X(*,LY)= 165000.
SIP< 41)=C.C2171263 X(N,IY)= 167890.
sip( 4?)=cr 797^7 84 x(n.ly) = 17 7 roc
SLP( 43)=C.C4C65362 X(N,LY)= 1787C0.
SLP( 44)=C.C19C4319 X(N,IY)= 182901.
XNK= 148515. BX(J)= 196703. M= 44 Z= 48187.61
.
SLAC—4-5J_= C . C 2 65,7-4JSO—X LN-, LYJ-= LBAC-JDjCj
SLP( 46)=C.C2C43361 X(N,LY)= 186737.
XNK= 152596. 8X(J)= 196703. N= 46 Z= 44105.12
SLP( 47)=C.C3887753 X(N,LY)= 189200.
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. tfhen S (30) is compared to S , it is found
to be less and thus masking line of sight. Z = 70338.1^
was calculated from equation (22) Chapter II. A new value
for X is given as X ,= 118862 from equation (23). Using
the assumption that targets fly over the terrain when the
flight path passes through terrain, a new comparison slope
is calculated and X . is changed from 26l40 to 118862.
Three more terrain obstructions exist such that the final
value of x^ = 1837^0. From equation (37), XD =-1953.7
which indicates that no time is available to fire any
rounds and battery 6 contributes no probability of kill at
terrain point 62, and altitude 7» Figure 19 illustrates a
case where terrain masking occurs once but a distance of
^830.9 feet for XD remains for firing remembering that the
time for firing the first and last round have already been
removed from XD « Therefore three rounds are fired, one
more than shown on Figure 19 which is the last round fired.
The slope comparison calculation is performed 18,^90 times
less those cases where negative elevation angles occur and
the terrain point is out of range of the battery being
evaluated.
Probability Calculations . A sample of computer output of
probability calculations is found in Figures 19, 20, and 21.
Figure 19 is a sample of a radar controlled gun battery.
As was seen, three rounds were fired with a probability of
kill of p (1) = 0^6. This is the battery kill probability
k
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Figure 21
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5089, 3059, and 1280 feet. Due to the short range, the p
are .04, .08, and .1. Looking at Figure 21, a run of 17
rounds was fired. Here the altitude eliminates terrain
masking with a course length of XQ = 33762.9 feet. However,
the range has increased to 23,526 feet so that the p. vary
from .00046 to . 06l. The battery kill probability,
p (ty) = .46. This probability is the same as for battery 1
k
in the earlier example. The short range in the other example
accounts for the high probability for only 12 rounds fired.
Figure 20 is the calculations for an automatic weapon battery.
Fifty rounds were fired in this case. Actually more rounds
could have been fired but the constraint on this weapon
system limits firing to 50 rounds. The range is about 4500
feet on the average with P varying from .000016 to .0000217.
The battery kill probability is Pk (5) = .0064.
Program Results . Appendix V is a set of sample curves which
plot altitude versus cumulative probability of kill for
specific terrain points. The program prints out the curve
for each terrain point examined. Included in the set are
illustrative examples of program results.
Appendix VI is a set of curves plotting probability
cost index versus altitude above terrain. This curve is
obtained by the following relationship:
P = R . + ( I- Pn ) (53)





= the Probabllltv that the aircraft pilot
detects the navigational target.
The values for p_, were obtained from the computer program
VISTRAC in reference 1.
Analysis of Results
The purpose of the mathmetical and computer models of
the air defense complex is to compute and plot a curve of
provability of kill versus altitude at each terrain point.
Having obtained these curves, it is necessary to analyze
them in order to determine the reasons for their shape.
With this information, the application for the model's
output can then be considered.
Terrain Effects . One of the most significant contributors
to the shape of these curves is the terrain within which
the air defense is situated. As was seen in Chapter II,
Figures 5 through ?» the terrain has different formations
producing different curves. The curves in Appendix V
illustrate this fact.
Due to inaccessibility, many prominent terrain points
are not occupied by firing batteries and only cause serious
masking to batteries located on accessible terrain with
less altitude than some others." The result is that at low
altitudes of approach, some batteries may be masked and
contribute no probability of kill to the target. Whereas
at higher altitudes the target is unmasked soon enough to
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be fired upon by the battery. Figure 22 illustrates this
concept. The line of sight to altitude 1 intersects the
course line at A and XD1 = BE. From this result it
is clear that the probability of kill at altitude 2,
PKk2 > ^Kkl since ^n2 > XD1 due to increa-sing the altitude
of approach. With the effect of terrain masking above,
more rounds will be fired as altitude is increased.
It can be observed in Appendix V that some curves
appear to have discrete jumps or regions of discontinuity.
This is caused by terrain effects as well. These jumps
occur, when at the lower altitudes, a particular battery
with high single shot kill probability is masked. At the
mext altitude of approach considered, the battery is sudden-
ly unmasked and a large jump in probability is the result.
Effect of System Parameters . The battery effectiveness
envelope is another influencing factor to curve shaping.
This envelope was shown in Figure 1, Chapter II. In Figure
1, notice the curve of the envelope as altitude increases.
This curve is an assumption which approximates the effect-
iveness of the average type system in use. If this model
is used to simulate a weapon system with a radically differ-
ent envelope, then a modification may be in order. The
effect of the assumed envelope is also illustrated in
Figure 22. At altitude 3? the line of sight intersects
the target course line at G, but is beyond the range of the
gun system. Therefore, XDo = OF since C is the point where




It is obvious that CF < BF by the amount of BC from which
it is determined that XD^ < XD2 and accordingly PKko < PKv2«
This then illustrates why the curves tend to slope down as
altitude is increased over some regions of altitude.
Another system parameter which effects the output
curves is radar performance
. In Chapter II, the half power
point of a radar beam pattern is assumed to be the con-
servative limit of usable volume coverage provided. There-
fore, any target in this model falling within the beam
pattern is assumed detected with probability 1. This
assumes a lateral range curve to be
(5*0
where
Substituting (55) into (5*0 results in
( ; x >R
These equations are found in reference 11. Figure 23 is a
plot of such a lateral range curve , The model assumed no
maximum value for R as a parameter Input. The maximum value
R can take on is limited by the length of the terrain coor-
dinate system. Maximum R used for the computer program is
47 miles. A nominal value for battery acquisition radars is






maximum rated range of a particular system, then a value of
R for radar detection would have to be assigned. Further,
if the radar detection range normally used in the program
were at the maximum rated range, the assumption of equation
(5&) may introduce significant error and a different radar
detection rate would have to be incorporated into the model.
The reason this factor was not developed was due to the
extremely low altitudes of target approach where a detection
range does not become greater than a value much less than
the maximum rated range of the radar. Such a development
would constitute a needless complication.
Two other parameters were used to perform a sensitivity
analysis to determine the effect of a change in these
parameters on the probability curves. The minimum and
maximum range of the AAW battery was originally 500 feet
and 6000 feet respectively. These values were changed to
1500 and 9000 feet for one run of the computer. Curve
number 8 in Appendix V is the result of using both para-
meters plotted on one graph. Curve I is the result of the
increased parameters. These two curves are not radically
different, but the increased range did cause a general
increase in probability for most values of altitude. The
rate of fire and total number of rounds fired per run per
gun is a more powerful factor in the model. Curve 5 in
Appendix V is a curve for AA'J batteries firing up to 200
rounds per gun per run at 1000 rounds per minute with 10
guns firing independently per battery. The result of this
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situation is a very high probability curve which is obvious
since if sufficient rounds are fired high probabilities will
result. Practical constraints will not permit this type of
performance in the usual case.
Battery Emplacement Effects
. The probability curves gener-
ated by the terrain in the computer model are found to be
quite different from terrain point to terrain point. A few
curves from adjacent terrain points are similar in the case
where terrain does not change rapidly. Except for this case,
the curves have different shapes. A different curve will
obviously result if a different battery emplacement scheme
is implemented since new battery to terrain masking situa-
tions occur. As the program calculates probabilities for the
different terrain points, new situations occur such as a
battery on a high peak is in range or a battery behind a
peak is unmasked. This variation in terrain conditions is
why the curves are not exactly related even though the
probabilities calculated are cumulative. The curves for
terrain points ^7 and 69, curves 3 and 4, Appendix V, when
compared, are found to be quite different. An additional
factor to be kept in mind is that the altitudes above
terrain are not at the same absolute altitude. Altitude
600 at terrain point 4? is not necessarily the same altitude
at terrain point 69, There is no intention that there be
any relationship between the different terrain points. The
probability curve for each terrain point is separate and
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distinct from any other unless, of course, ther is little
terrain change between them except the X coordinate distance.
Model Application
In Chapter I, it was pointed out that the work done
in reference 1 found the relationship between probability of
radar detection and altitude above terrain to be approxi-
mately linear. As a result, the computer program incorpor-
ated a linear fit to the data. Following this the proba-
bility of pilot navigation was added to the linear function.
The functional relationship was necessary for use in the
simplex algorithm for linear program solution for the optimal
altitude of approach,, At the beginning of this work, the
concept was to develop the air defense model as an input
to the program in reference 1. After examining the output
curves of Appendix V a linear fit did not appear feasible
for the data. In order to determine how bad a linearity
assumption would be, a regression equation was calculated
from the data of terrain point 62 in Appendix V. Curve
number k is a plot of the equation. The function derived
is given by
Y = .128 + .000369 X (57)
To submit the output data to a linear fit would introduce
serious misrepresentation of the model capability. This
fact is obvious from the results of the linear fit to the
data of terrain point 62.
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Probability Cost Index
. The curves in Appendix VI are a
probability cost index. The values are not true proba-
bilities since they are the sum of two probabilities as
shown in equation (53). The term cost is defined to be a
measure of the material effort necessary to penetrate the
defense, reach the target, and deliver the ordnance. Since
either one of the events constitutes failure in the mission,
the higher the value of the cost index the greater the
chance that the mission will be a failure. Consequently,
the survivability of the aircraft in the penetration effort
is maximized when the cost index is minimized.
Ahen examining the curves in Appendix VI, it is ob-
served that each curve contains a global minimum. The
curves then possess a point which minimizes the cost Index





The development of the air defense model within the
assumptions and limitations is complete. As a result of
the output from the computer model it is concluded:
(1) That the probability calculations developed a
result that varies with terrain, air defense systems, and
employment tactics
.
Consequently, no assumption of linear-
ity between probability of kill and altitude above terrain
is justified. In fact, an investigation of the degree of
polynomial that a least square fit would require to model
the curves in Appendix VI is necessary. Such an investi-
gation would be required to discover how the degree would
vary with terrain points using the same system parameters.
It would also have to determine how the degree would vary
with different air defense systems and terrain. Before
an algorithm can be found to solve for the minimum point
on the cost curve, the curve itself must be functionally
modeled.
(2) That no practical results would be obtained from
inserting the output from the air defense model into the
program in reference 1. If such an attempt were made, the
simplex algorithm used in reference 1 would obtain a solu-
tion, but it would not be known if the solution were the
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global minimum. Further, the linear regression curve would
grossly missrepresent the probabilities calculated by the
air defense model.
(3) That further investigation is necessary to discover
the feasibility of fitting the curves in Appendix VI to
some degree polynomial such that the degree chosen is
acceptable for the curves of all the terrain points. If a
single degree polynomial is not feasible, then a method of
finding the best fit for each curve over a specified range
of altitudes must be adopted.
(4) That having determined the functional relation-
ship for the probability cost curve, a non linear programing
algorithm must be found that solves for the global minimum
of each curve within the aircraft flight path constraints
used in reference 1.
Air Defense Model Extensions
Two major assumptions in the air defense model should
be investigated further c The assumption of independence
between rounds fired successively from the same gun may
introduce serious error. Research into the determination of
the relative Lghl . n to corr< I ited md uncorrected
error should give an 1 ion of how un] ilistic the
assumption of independence really is. If independence is
unacceptable then means for finding the conditional proba-
bilities associated with dependently fired rounds should
be studied.
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An additional problem for further study is the assump-
tion that the gun fire shot pattern is circular normal.
Much evidence points to the fact that the shot pattern is
actually elliptical normal. Empirical equations for the
elliptical normal error pattern such as equation (42) and
(48), Chapter II in the circular normal case should be used
if such equations exist.
The final extension is in the area of three dimensional
terrain. As was previously pointed out, the Fortran code
written for evaluation of line of sight in three dimensional
terrain was not verified. Mith the availability of digital-
ized terrain this portion of the program should be verified.
However, one serious disadvantage in the concept used in
this model is the requirement that the target course line
be parallel to the X axis of the coordinate system. The
problem lies in the necessity of assigning new altitude
values for each different route of approach into the target.
Another method for determining line of sight between 2
points in 3 dimensional terrain is found in reference 6.
This method requires a least square fit to the terrain
points lying on the line between the two points for which
line of sight is being determined. Then the method deter-
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APPENDIX II
TERRAIN AND BATTERY COORDINATES
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GLOSSARY OP FORTRAN VARIABLE NAMES
The following is a list of Fortran variable names in
the order of appearance. This list excludes the system












THE X COORDINATE OF THE KTH TERRAIN
POINT WITH THE LY TH Y COORDINATE INDEX
THE H COORDINATE OR ALTITUDE OF THE KTH
TERRAIN POINT WITH LY TH Y COORDINATE
INDEX
THE Y COORDINATE OF THE KTH TERRAIN POINT
WITH LY TH Y COORDINATE INDEX, SET EQUAL
TO FOR TWO DIMENSIONAL TERRAIN
X COORDINATE OF THE JTH BATTERY
Y COORDINATE OF THE JTH BATTERY SET EQUAL
TO FOR 2 DIMENSIONAL TERRAIN
H COORDINATE OF THE JTH BATTERY
AN ARRAY USED WITH SUBROUTINE UTPLOT
ALTITUDE ABOVE TERRAIN FOR THE ITH POINT
THE DIFFERENCE IN X COORDINATES OF THE
KTH TERRAIN POINT AND THE JTH BATTERY
THE DIFFERENCE IN Y COORDINATES OF THE
KTH TERRAIN POINT AND JTH BATTERY
THE DIFFERENCE IN THE H COORDINATES OF















MAXIMUM ELEVATION TRACKING RATE FOR THE
SPECIFIC BATTERY BEING EXAMINED
MAXIMUM AZIMUTH TRACKING RATE OF THE
SPECIFIC BATTERY BEING EXAMINED
MINIMUM RANGE OF THE SPECIFIC BATTERY
BEING EXAMINED
MAXIMUM RANGE OF THE BATTERY BEING
EXAMINED
DETECTION RADAR LOWER EDGE OF BEAM
PATTERN ELEVATION ANGLE IN DEGREES OF
THE BATTERY BEING EXAMINED
SYSTEM DELAY TIME FOR THE BATTERY BEING
EXAMINED
CREtf REACTION TIME FOR THE BATTERY BEING
EXAMINED
SLANT RANGE TO THE (K,I)TH POINT
HORIZONTAL COMPONENT OF MINIMUM RANGE
HORIZONTAL COMPONENT OF RS
HORIZONTAL COMPONENT OF THE RANGE OF THE
POINT rfHERE THE LINE DRAM FROM THE
MAXIMUM ELEVATION ANGLE INTERSECTS THE
TARGET COURSE LINE
THE SLANT RANGE '//HERE MAXIMUM AZIMUTH
RATE OCCURS
THE SLANT RANGE ^HERE MAXIMUM ELEVATION
RATE OCCURS
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XD THE DISTANCE ON THE TARGET COURSE LINE
AVAILABLE FOR FIRING ALL BUT FIRST AND
LAST ROUNDS
OPEN FORE SLANT RANGE
TIME AVAILABLE FOR FIRING EXCLUDING
FIRST AND LAST ROUNDS
NUMBER OF ROUNDS FIRED PER RUN
HORIZONTAL RANGE TO MAXIMUM RADAR
DETECTION POINT ON COURSE LINE
TIME OF FLIGHT
NUMBER OF GUNS PER BATTERY, RADAR CON-
TROLLED GUN BATTERY
RANGE OF II TH ROUND FIRED
THE FIRING ERROR RADIUS OF THE II TH
ROUND FIRED
FIRING ERROR OF THE RADAR CONTROLLED GUN
THE PROBABILITY OF KILL OF THE II TH
ROUND FIRED
NS
TW Tf (l-EP(II)) FOR THE RADAR CONTROLLED
L=I
BATTERY
PD(J) PROBABILITY OF KILL OF THE JTH BATTERY
NS
TY 77 (l-EP(II)) FOR AArf BATTERY
L=I
NT, XNR NUMBER OF MISSILES FIRED
NFU
TP Tf (l-PK(J)) THE PROBABILITY THAT NO
L=I












PHI(K,I) PROBABILITY THE AIRCRAFT IS KILLED AT THE
(K,I)TH POINT IN SPACE
SUBROUTINE LOS
RXM HORIZONTAL COMPONENT OF MAXIMUM FIRING
RANGE
XNK X COORDINATE ON TARGET COURSE LINE OF
FIRST RADAR DETECTION POINT
KK X COORDINATE INDEX OF LAST TERRAIN POINT
BETWEEN POINT IN SPACE FOR CALCULATION
AND THE BATTERY
II X COORDINATE INDEX OF FIRST TERRAIN POINT
BETWEEN POINT IN SPACE FOR CALCULATION
AND THE BATTERY
SLPD THE SLOPE OF THE LINE BETWEEN THE POINT
OF FIRST RADAR DETECTION AND THE BATTERY
3LP(M) THE SLOPE OF EACH OF THE M TERRAIN POINTS
THAT MAY CAUSE TERRAIN MASKING ON EACH
FIRING RUN
Z DISTANCE ON TARGET COURSE LINE FROM POINT
OF TERRAIN UNMASKING TO THE BATTERY
XDR THE DISTANCE BETWEEN POINT OF FIRST
RADAR DETECTION AND OPEN FIRE POINT, ALSO
CALLED 'WARNING TIME DISTANCE
TT TOTAL DELAY DISTANCE ON TARGET COURSE
LINE SUBROUTINE SEE
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EYE INDICATION OF WHETHER LINE OF SIGHT EXISTS
FOR EACH CALLING OF THE SUBROUTINE SEE
EYE = INDICATES LINE OF SIGHT EXISTS
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TMP1 ICT T RFAl*B( 4-H.n-7),
REAI *4AX1 ( T~ ) ,°HT (?M f RAN
COMMON »H(^r)| ,H(!2M1 )
1<( ^» ,PHH 1 P r , ^M ,AXH(1' n
131
nAT4 NAP/1 V.NTT/B4/,
1PMF./1 2. •V,A7PMA/? r).'V,A7P
1S6?T.1/,TMCT1/1. 12/,THFT?
KC'.NY/l /,YK/S"1.'V,VT/-'






'E&0 •-.((( x< I , i|,HII,JI,Y
S FORMAT! 3F1-". r >
REAO S, < ( RX< L ) ,PY(( ) ,RH(!
RE*Q "?, (PHI I ) ,1 = 1 ,W»9|
T FORMATtFI 1, 4)
CCM »U T P PK Fnp EACH TERRA
THFTl=THFTl*i. 1 4,1 5<>26S /I P
THFT? = THFT?+'». 141 5Q? 65/'. P
TMFT7=THFT^*->,1415 <3'>(S5/' fi
47P Mf, = A7P mc* o.i 415^2^5/^
AZRMA=A7PMa*3.i4isq?65/!P
47PMM = A7DMM*->.1415Q?A5/1P
FF = FF*">. 141 C<37AS/1PC.
RANG C I 1 |rl1f,
P ANG C ( ->)=0.
RANGEIMM "
PANGEI 41 =«,
nn 7n k=nti ,ntt
rOMODTc pk FCP C ACH ALTIT
r>0 2" I = 1 , NAP
HP = I
AH( I )=H(K ,1 Y)+PR*l nn .
rriMPHTF PK COP FACH FIPF
TO 3" J = 1 ,N C U
IF( .I.LF.I Tl ) Gn to 140
IF(J.LF.LT2) f," T 'SO
IF( J.LF.l Tl) GT t° 160
14" «?IRX = C 1 R*G
47PX=4ZR*G
rmp=rmFG





I S~ clrx==i rmh
R>F=RMF 4





GO Tr| '1 C
1 6" C LR X=F| P"M
RMF=RMF«
3 M- R MM
SZPX= AZRMM
THFTA = T HFT-<
AT=ATM
TR=TRM
-7RFV C NT PljTRrUNT FIRING
1 nt -iFl tk-i X ( K,l YI-PXI J) )
'}«=!_ TX =PABSf XI K,t YI-RX(J) t
TF( TFLTX. GT. ". ) nEI T X= r
HEL T H ="APM i"H( T )_PH«J) I
DFLTY=n5BS(Y(K,lY)-BY< J)
os = n<;oP T inFtTx* riFLTX + OFLT
T C (°S.GT.RU) f-,7 TO IT
TfTCRMT'jc TF FI^VATTHN I?
IF( <VH( I ) -PH( I) ) 7 f% 1^,
THFTK cno mjmjmiiM PIPING
1* MC = RviF*prf <; ( Fp I
xs = n<;ooT( nFLTx«iEl yx + Ofi
MFT = OFL TH /^TANI " )
TF( RXS. GT.mft 1 <~,r rr 51





40 nFI TX = nSQR TJ PxS*RX c.-nELTY
c- PRINT 1A7,nriTX ,HF,HFT,P
\f7 fhpmjt( 7 r x, • r-Fl Tx = ' .' * , c '
5" rpvTfMiit:
JF( ICJTy, CO, ". ) i~,0 TO 15*,
'-HFTk' FOP MSXTM'IM ^7|MMTH
47R^VT*nFLTY/(RS*R^-OFLTH
RCfl = (1SnOT(uT*nFI ty/A7RX»pi
TF( 4 7R.r.T. 4 7PX) ^S = P C A
CHFTX F^P Mixl«IJM FLFV4T1
i *,*, c^d-i v T ^nS nPT( T r L TH*npLTH
5SF = nSfiPT| (VT*r)^QRT(nELTM
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nP, ™' A ° ' • * M . THFT * , TR , A T , VT , YK , XD
&PTNT ^??!xpIj*K ?' ' * "»S«f»H f PXM t R**|
iu
R
MLTiTinriax:n! r2 '' 1,lx ' ,RTQY=,,n, ' TFRPAT "' w"'«T, »i**"-.
psf=osopt( ( pfi Tx*xn)*#?*nELTY*PF| ty*dfi TH*nei tmi
tf( j. i f. LTl) go m 5fp
!F( j. ie. i T?t r;n to ^c
'MI.IMTM GO TO 700
T=(xn/vT )
ns=t/t} p
TF( r»H.r.T.RXM) ns^ns + i
xnr = n<;

































t O+ l TXJ.LT l ) "-> pt
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cpi=pn( I I )
rONTTNliF
PK( It =< 1. l-( TW)**NGUN)
? RINT 411 ,TW..) r PK( ,)|CPPMAT(TX,« ( 1-oiUl-P?)l^X, »PK( •,!?,') = « ,1X,F1 "
DP T*JT Sol ,XVR ,T,'F
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IF( f XH*0EL T X I .IT. ( WT*VT*1 . "/TCP4I ) G n Tl~) 144
R(1l)=n<;op-r (fxn+0FITX-WT*VT«l.i/ T rPa)**?<-0FLTH-nFLTH + pi'r lTY*nEITY)
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PRINT f 4," ,x^ , P ,o<( |)
^OR ,'4T(1 l"X,'XMP = >,F?.",1X,«r'K(.|)=»,1X f F70
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T=( X0/V T )
WP=NP
MT = »IR
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TFMO = |, 1
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75 1 = 1,30
I l=»AA*10O.
T ) = PH!(K,II
INIIF
INI IF
IV n level 1 , nnn 7 LOS fiate 6P7">P 1 7/61 /66
2!
SLIRROUTTNF L^MPM,*,! f ).l
IMPLICIT RFA1 *«.( i-H,n-7)
,
common ih( 7"i ,h( 1 ?n,i )
1K(3 -l ),PHI( \?r 3TJ ,/*XH(l?o
f CAlClllATE oicfANCE PM COM
f OAlC'ILATc RAPAR WARNING T
RK = . ?l'
RXM=n50PT(RM*RM-nFI TH*DFL
RH=OSQPT( I OF 1 TH/r>TAN<THET






f PRINT 6,K , I ,
J
C 6 FORMAT! I"X, • TP=« , IX, T3,l X
C "PINT 1 5* f XN*,RX( J» ,RX»«
C is-, FO pM4T< lnx, •xm*= • ,1 x,Fl"
r 1
1
'F( XNK. FO. "Xf Jl ) r,n Tn 73
NXK=XNK
TFIRYIJ I. NF.o, ) 00 TO '"
11=0
HP 71 M = l ,MTT
IF(I1.WF.1I CO TO *2
IF< XMK.IT, X(".LY( )I I=*




16 SLPR=( AH( tt-PH< Jl ) /(RX( Jl
T PRINT 7 ci.pp KK,II
f 7 FORMAT! Ir^x, • SLP^=' ,T X,Fl r
00 'CO M=I I ,KK
IF(KK-H) ".K.IO
l" <l P(M) = ( AMI I )-H( M,l Y) ) /(
C PRINT ?",M,SLP( M ) ,XI M,LY)
C 2" F0P M AT« l.CX. '?l Pf • . 13, •»-•
IF(SIPR.PT.SLP(m» j r,0 Tn
r,o to -«oo
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XNK = RX( .\)-7
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00 320 M=? ,KK
CALL $FF( NXK,w ,1 , J,EYE,LY
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RXM = OMT Nl ( RXM,BM)
RPF = OC0R"r (RX"**XM*PFLTH<'n
( 1 (=pnc
IF(J.LE.LTl) CO tp s"p
I
c ( .I.LF.l T7) nO TO 6"0
IF( J.LF.I T') r.O to too
5 or TFsAOJ + YM^pnF
CO TO 30
6C~ TF =OEXP(CCNT*RnF )
CO TO •>"
7C" TF=!RnF-?M) /SM
I" TT= ( TR44T+TF ) *VT
XOR=°H-PXM
IF( XOR, fo.O. I 0,0 TO 236
TF( TT.LT, xnp ) CO TO 51
TT=TT-XOB





C PRINT ?" f RH,RX«4,X0,XOR ,TT





Y.OFLTX.OFLTY.nFLTM, At>I ,YM,T HFTA,TR, AT.VT
I T->,CnNT,7M,SM,RH,PXM,C<Ft
INTFCF^*4( I-N)
,«( 1 2^,1) , v( l?-0,l) ,PX( ' r > I ,^Y(?r ) ,RH< 7 l, p
,•>"( ,<:| Pf"'l ,RI 20^ ) ,SIG( ?r' ) ,"l 7pr I






, 'ALT=« ,2X,!3,IX,«RTRY=« , 1 X, I3»














M.LY) I / (HI M,LY) -RH( I ) I
-XNK I
RX( J)=«,F]0.o,tM = t , 13)





































IMPLJC'T REM *«MA-H,0-n f INTEGER** M-N»
iKn"i f PHi<i?r,-*i|,AXHn2', ,'<o), <;:iP<':>"'i, cM7'"> r
XNK=NXf
RMRX'DSORTJ (PY(. II -Y(K,LY )(**?( *X(. I l-XNK )*?
)
SLt"»»«H( J,( Y1-^H< J) ) /RMRX
Nr((PY(JI-Y(K,LYI l/YK I- QP99
NYK=YK
LYK=LY
SS = < ^Y( J l-LYK) /RMRX
op TNT '.O.J,*^
FCPMATdnx.'RTRYISSI^t^X.FlO <« I
OP I -1 I I = I . N
XK = YK*PTANinARrn<;|{P-Y(J)-LYK)/P«4RX»)
LXK=( XK*XNK I /YK
XXK=LXK
DX = XK + XNJK-XXtf
TFCOX.l t..i;| p,n T" 5 A
LXK=LXK+1
LYK = L YK + YK
X1=T»1
SLPJ=(H(K ,1 Y)-H( LXK.LYK ) I /OSQRHYKi YK+XK1-XK )










PX( 2"* l,BY(?i) ,«H( 2-i|
,str,(w i ,fpi 2 r ^ i
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0.9328496 1100 C. 9937496
0.9329319 120C 0.9874319
0.9559594 1300 1.0060587

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0.8060656 1100 C. 8669655
0.9227645 1200 0.9772644
0.9237672 1300 C. 9738672
0.9685816 1400 1.G160309
0.9673398 1500 1.0127392
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